# **1AC**

#### **The US response to terrorism has resulted in an autoimmune crisis, exemplified by increasing indefinite detention of citizens, permanent residents, and foreigners. This treatment poses the greatest threat to the US and abroad by undermining the morals we claim to protect.**Addis (Boston University Law Review, Vol 87:323 <http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume87n2/documents/ADDISv.2.pdf>)

In the same way that the physical body has clearly demarcated boundaries, ¶ the body politic also has defined territorial and institutional boundaries. A ¶ political community is defined not only by the territory it occupies and the ¶ people that inhabit it, but also by the institutions and norms that organize it.74¶ When terrorists attack, they wish to target not only infrastructure and people, ¶ but also the institutions and norms that they believe organize and shape that ¶ particular political community.75 Indeed, in some circumstances they ¶ announce that to be their objective.76 The leaders of the target countries often ¶ claim this to be the terrorists’ objective as well.77 Ironically, though, when a government responds to this outside invader in the way the United States has, ¶ such a response more than anything else threatens the integrity and health of ¶ the body politic. The result is similar to an autoimmunity crisis.¶ There are five distinct ways in which the war on terror may be leading to the ¶ injury of the very community (body politic) that the war is supposed to protect ¶ from terrorist threat. **First**, at the most basic level**, the war on terror has** ¶ **continually undermined the institutions that define who we are. Practices such** ¶as prolonged detentions **without trial or access to family and lawye**rs,78 the ¶ **establishment of secret detention centers**,79 the use of rendition to outsource ¶,80 and even the use ¶ of highly questionable **torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment of detainees** tactics against prisoners for information gathering have ¶ done just that.81 As Lord Hoffmann noted in a concurring opinion in A v. ¶ Secretary of State for the Home Department, **“The real threat . . . comes not from terrorism but from [practices] such as these.”82 In the process of** ¶ **undermining the institutions and processes that define us, the war on terror** ¶ **threatens to collapse the distinction between “us” and “them.”** **Our tactics** ¶ **increasingly become similar to tactics used by those we define as the Other**.83¶ Second, **the institutions that the war on terror has continually undermined in** ¶ **the guise of fighting terrorism make up the very fabric of our defense structure**. ¶ Take, for example, the self-defense principle discussed above.84 Undermining ¶ this principle in the name of effectively fighting terrorist threats will lead to an unstable world, a detriment to the global interests of the United States. With ¶ America’s unprecedented status as a world power comes unparalleled exposure ¶ to such threats and attacks. The administration’s doctrine of preventive war ¶ may provide analogous support for other states to act out their own paranoia or ¶ imperial ambition.85 Not only will this policy likely encourage other states to ¶ invoke self-defense to intervene in the internal affairs of others,86 it may even ¶ encourage terrorists to provide similar justifications. Rather than achieving ¶ total victory, **the war on terror is simply recycling and endlessly circulating the** ¶ **violence by engaging in repressive actions.**87 Also, noncompliance by the ¶ United States with the dictates of international institutions and processes, either ¶ in relation to the laws of war or human rights, has provided justification for ¶ other countries to flout aspects of international norms and processes.88¶

#### **Autoimmunity permeates all public policy. The need to securitize internationally becomes the need to securitize all of humanity in the name of a controllable future. This manipulation of temporal politics allows torture, dehumanization, and genocide to become acceptable practices of the present.**

Stockdale 10 (Liam, P.D., Ph.D. in International Relations, Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Stockdale.pdf>)

While the idea of pre-emption with regard to discourses of security is perhaps most¶ often associated with the so-called Bush Doctrine in US foreign policymaking0—most clearly¶ exemplified, of course, by the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Ehrenberg et al. 2010, C. Weber¶ 2007)—it must also be stressed that the notion of taking explicit action in the present to preempt potential irruptions of “danger” in the future—what might be termed the logic of preemption—is far from limited in its deployment to the realm of interstate security relations¶ alone. Indeed, as criminologist Richard Ericson asserts, the logic of pre-emption can be seen¶ to permeate all aspects of the exercise of sovereign power in the current moment, to the point¶ where the contemporary security environment might be best termed a “state of pre-emption”¶ (Ericson 2008: 58). Under such conditions, “security” is conceived in terms of safeguarding¶ the future from what may occur by undertaking precautionary measures in the present that are¶ conceived in relation to an imagined future. Security is thus pursued by attempting to “police¶ the future by anticipation,” with the ultimate goal being the realization of an imagined “future¶ perfect” where the “risks” against which these present exceptional practices are deployed will¶ no longer be of concern (Bigo 2007: 31).¶ Accordingly, the logic of pre-emption is innately concerned with exerting control over¶ the temporal dimension of human existence. Sovereign power deployed in pursuit of the logic¶ of pre-emption is thus active in both the spatial and temporal realms, as it attempts to¶ manipulate and control the relationship between present and future through “calculations¶ about probable futures in the present [the temporal element], followed by interventions into¶ the present in order to control that potential future [the spatial element]” (Aradau et al. 2008:¶ 149). The crucial point is that a security climate premised upon the logic of pre-emption is¶ concerned primarily with safeguarding the future, while the present is constructed in ¶ instrumental terms as a site of intervention through which this ultimate aim might be realized.¶ As such, to use the terminology of the Copenhagen School, under the logic of pre-emption,¶ the future is securitized (Buzan et al. 1998). The result is that the proverbial door is opened ¶ for the deployment of exceptional practices “beyond the realm of normal politics” in the¶ present, since the logic of pre-emption holds that it is through proactive/preemptive/precautionary measures enacted in the present that the security of the future can be¶ ensured.Yet the inherent unknowability of the future ensures that pre-emptive pursuits are¶ necessarily plagued by an information deficit, thus generating “an insatiable quest for¶ knowledge” on the part of sovereign authorities pursuing information related to potential¶ future dangers (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 91). Regardless of the success of such efforts,¶ however, the idea of pre-emptive security is perpetually imbued with an innate level of¶ uncertainty precisely because the future cannot be known for certain, no matter how detailed¶ and precise and rigorous the collected data and subsequent risk calculations might be (de¶ Goede 2008). This leads the imperatives of pre-emptive security to merge with a politics of¶ risk management premised upon the so-called “precautionary principle,” whereby sovereign ¶ decisions relating to appropriate pre-emptive action to be undertaken are made solely on the¶ basis of unsubstantiated suspicion or highly arbitrary (and often highly racialized) calculations¶ regarding the likelihood of a future irruption of threat (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 102).¶ Accordingly, the pre-emptive practices of sovereign power take on a highly biopolitical¶ character, as governmental intrusions into the everyday lives of individual subjects become an¶ crucial component of the pursuit of security. The securitization of the future thus necessitates¶ the deployment of an extensive array of governmental technologies—from conventional¶ military intervention, to indefinite detention, to pervasive surveillance and biometric¶ monitoring—in pursuit of information that might be relevant to preventing an irruption of¶ danger that may occur in at some indefinite point in the unknown future (Ibid. 105). Aradau ¶ and Van Munster (2007: 97), invoking Foucault, aptly refer to these practices collectively as a¶ precautionary “dispositif of risk,” capturing both the variety of techniques employed and the¶ ultimately unified objective of securing an imagined future that underwrites their enaction.

#### This is results in a psychological priming of individuals for globalized conflict- we are conditioned to ignore structural violence as the mere “condition of peace”- a faraway danger that doesn’t affect people who look like us.

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

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(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### The racism inherent in US justification of indefinite detention- abducting differently colored bodies from around the world and within US borders based on sharing characteristics we’ve been taught to associate with danger and instability- spills over to domestic policies as well. The desire for a “sterile” nation informs our relationship with the local “Other,” suppressing the voices of minorities, women, LBTQs and countless other identities.

Johnson 10’ (Andrew, Lecturer at Open University, The Pathology of Politics: Derrida’s reading of Auto-immunity and Carl Schmitt 09/12/10)

Auto-immunity is a concept that seeks to undermine this dependence upon the self in political philosophy. Take the example of democracy: In its constitutive autoimmunity, in its vocation of hospitality (with everything in the¶ ipse¶ that works over the etymology and experience of the¶ hospes¶ through the aporias of hospitality), democracy has always wanted by turns and at the same time two incompatible things: it has wanted, on the one hand, to welcome only men, and on the condition that they be citizens, brothers, and compeers, excluding all the others, in particular bad citizens, rogues, noncitizens, and all sorts of unlike and unrecognizable others, and, on the other hand, at the same time or by turns, it has wanted to open itself up, to offer hospitality, to all those excluded. In both cases, let us recall, and here is a problem I take up elsewhere, this hospitality remains limited and conditional. But even in this restricted space it is typical for the democracy to do one or the other, sometimes one and the other, sometime both at the same time and/or by turns. Rogues or degenerates are sometimes brothers, citizens, compeers (Rogues, p. 63).2¶ Derrida locates within democracy a “¶ constitutive autoimmunity ,” that seeks to immunize itself against threats and at the same moment remain open to excluded populations. Thus its constitutive logic is at heart paradoxical. Democracy, by definition, is exemplar of the essential¶ aporia¶ of auto-immunity: by its constitution, it is unable to recognize its mode of protection from its open hospitality to the other. Derrida’s use of auto-immunity becomes political, insofar as it describes the defense mechanisms put into place by a state to protect itself from what is outside and foreign. Immunity, auto-immunity, both biological and political, is an entire way of thinking of security, of borders, of protection schemes, but also, inversely, the means and extent of one’s hospitality. Auto-immunity, as a political concept, describes the immune system of the nation-state itself. Whereas democracy is threatened by its own mode of security/immunity, it has the audacity to hope for an unconditional hospitality that might create an ethically imperative politics.

#### In pursuit of so-called terrorists, the US have reduced its foreign policy tactics to the Precautionary Principle- striking any would-be threat and using war as our primary means of communication with the middle east. This has resulted in the transfer of power to the Military Industrial Complex and the few elites who control it.

Addis (Boston University Law Review, Vol 87:323 <http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume87n2/documents/ADDISv.2.pdf>)

The war on terror is radically recasting the notion of preemptive self-defense from that of an emergency measure designed to allow a state to respond to an imminent threat, to one by which a state (in this case the United States) plays the role of guarantor of international peace and security, a role the Charter ¶ explicitly allocates to the Security Council.54 The reallocation of war-making ¶ power is being effected without an amendment to the Charter. There is no ¶ dispute that in the era of weapons of mass destruction the international ¶ community must be proactive, not merely reactive, in the maintenance of ¶ global peace and security. The debate lies in who should authorize such action ¶ and whether the self-defense principle should be transformed into a means by ¶ which each state plays the role of the guarantor of international peace and ¶ security. The Bush doctrine of preventive war threatens to lead to the reallocation of ¶ international war-making power. As part of a new National Security Strategy ¶ and the war on terror, the Bush administration has called for preventive attacks ¶ on so-called “rogue states” who may be potential enemies, even though their ¶ intentions and their capacity to threaten the United States were not yet clear.55¶ The rationale for the policy is that living in an age of terrorism, where an ¶ attack could come at any time and from anywhere, requires the United States ¶ to defend itself by attacking rogue states that give shelter to terrorist groups ¶ and those who seek to develop weapons of mass destruction which may end up ¶ in terrorist hands. The plan is to deprive terrorists of hiding places and rogue ¶ states of the capacity to inflict great damage on the United States in the ¶ future.56 Some commentators have likened this policy of preventive attack to ¶ the well-known “Precautionary Principle” employed in the health and ¶ environmental fields, which states that lack of scientific certainty should not forestall an action that might prevent serious or irreversible harm.57 This ¶ comparison is borne out by the following passage in the National Security ¶ Strategy:¶ We cannot let our enemies strike first. . . . The greater the threat, the ¶ greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for ¶ taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains ¶ as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent ¶ such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, ¶ act preemptively.58 The invasion of Iraq was at one time justified as a preventive action,59 and the ¶ U.S. administration has not precluded the possibility that Iran could also be a ¶ target of that policy.¶ The Bush preventive (precautionary) doctrine not only dispenses with the ¶ requirement of imminence, but also shifts the burden to the target states to ¶ demonstrate that they do not harbor terrorists or WMDs, and are not in the ¶ process of developing WMDs.60 The notion of preventive self-defense that the ¶ Bush administration has put forward therefore undermines the idea that self defense is an emergency measure designed to deal with imminent threats. ¶ Further, this version of self-defense undermines the notion that those who ¶ claim there is a threat have the burden of demonstrating that a risk exists and ¶ that it cannot be prevented by any other means. The report of the High-Level ¶ Panel, established by the Secretary-General to advise him on the major issues facing the U.N. and the world, cautions that such preventive military action ¶ will transform the allocation of war-making power. Additionally, the report ¶ states that “in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global ¶ order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is ¶ simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action . . . to be ¶ accepted.”61 Under the doctrine of preventive war, a war-making measure that ¶ was devised to deal with emergencies becomes part of the arsenal of ordinary ¶ foreign policy strategies. This, of course, takes us back to the pre-WWII ¶ paradigm that the United Nations regime was meant to have abolished.¶ The notion of preventive attack that the Bush administration has adopted as ¶ an official policy is premised on the idea that the United States has been ¶ engaged in a war since at least September 11. Winning the war under this ¶ policy requires preventive attacks that will impair the capacities of not only ¶ known enemies but also potential enemies, preventing both known and ¶ potential risks. Conceptualizing the struggle against terrorism as a war and ¶ viewing preventive attacks as necessary to successfully prosecute the war turns ¶ the measure that was developed to respond to emergencies into an ordinary ¶ instrument of foreign policy. Such a view also leads to the restructuring of the ¶ allocation of war-making powers that was carefully developed by the U.N. ¶ Charter and the United Nations system.¶ The idea of preventive war is an informal suspension of the principle of self defense. The principle of self-defense is not formally suspended or dispensed ¶ with, but is drastically altered in the name of applying it to this perceived new ¶ circumstance.62 A doctrine that was carefully crafted to deal with emergencies ¶ has, through the policy of preventive war, been transformed into an ordinary ¶ foreign and military policy option, the very thing that the post-WWII ¶ international order was meant to have rejected.63¶ The effect of the war on terror on the principle of self-defense – and on ¶ other aspects of national and international law – is evidenced in more than the ¶ restructuring of the allocation of powers and the transformation of emergency ¶ measures into ordinary processes. It is also contributing to a condition where, in the name of fighting terrorism, the evil Other,64 the United States is turning ¶ on its own body, namely, the institutions and processes that define it and that ¶ perhaps are the country’s best hope for providing immunity from the threats ¶ that terrorism poses. Put simply, the war on terror is leading to an ¶ autoimmunity crisis.

#### Without rupturing that logic through complete hospitality towards the other and the inclusion of different kinds of voices, a global nuclear disaster is inevitable.

Anthony ‘95

Carl Anthony is the Executive Director of the Urban Habitat Program and the chair of the East Bay Conversion Reinvestment Commission Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Freedom from Annihilation Is a Human Right Spring Summer 1995 <http://urbanhabitat.org/node/945> \*language modified

Nuclear weapons are tools of a conquering, violent culture. Racism at domestic and international levels heightens the potential vulnerability and miscalculation surrounding nuclear proliferation. Few people of color have had any role in debate, development, or decision-making about the goals of this brutal technology. In a nuclear ~~holocaust~~ [war] whole populations will be vaporized in the flash of an eye. People deciding the appropriateness of such a choice inevitably would bring their prejudices and fears to the devastating decision to annihilate whole peoples. The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of a Eurocentric technological elite, paranoid about the aims and aspirations of the majority of the world's population—people of color—magnifies the potential for global disaster. The great and growing gulf of human communication between the rich and poor, European and non-European, multiplies the potential antagonism that could result in planetary holocaust. In this context organizing against nuclear proliferation is, by definition, a multicultural effort, bringing the intelligence and wisdom of every community to the global task of defeating the excesses of racism, human aggression, and technology-gone-berserk.

#### It is a priori to refuse the totalizing drive for stability which has prioritized geopolitics over human rights.  This critical ethos is more important than the particular decision itself. The alternative is the destruction of ethics.

Alex Thomson, lecturer in English at the University of Glasgow, Deconstruction and Democracy, 2005, p. 196-197

The affirmation of this kind of analysis would need to be articulated with whatever directly strategic interventions are possible: for example either the affirmation of particular cosmopolitan or internationalist treaties and organizations, or their critique. The task of thought would be to judge as best one can which moment is most propitious for either. I have shown that Derrida’s comments on hospitality, the cosmopolitical and international law are consistent with this proposition. Such work would mean translating deconstruction not only from one institutional context to another, or showing deconstruction to be already at work there, but from one national or state context to another, and from one philosophical idiom to another. But in addition to its more familiar form as intellectual genealogy, a negotiation with the tradition of inherited political concepts, I have suggested that deconstruction might also be the model for a mode of political analysis, which would be concerned with the political event as a combination of a set of depoliticizing tendencies, which together testify to the possibility of a repoliticization. This is a project which exceeds the scope of this book. It also remains essentially ambiguous, and highly susceptible to the necessary and inevitable institutionalization of deconstruction which Derrida describes in his paper ‘Some statements and truisms ...’, and which can itself be understood as more or less equivalent to what I have designated as depoliticization. Such analyses would have to develop out of the events themselves, rather than approaching a particular political problem with a predetermined deconstructive grid to lay over it. Derrida’s insistence that deconstruction is what happens, that deconstruction is democracy, means not only that deconstruction can be considered as a political practice. It must lead us not only to see deconstruction as politics, but politics as deconstruction. Indeed, a deconstructive account of politics might focus not so much on what deconstruction has to say about politics, as on what politics has to tell us about deconstruction. The structure I have set out in this chapter is well described in these remarks: All that a deconstructive point of view tries to show, is that since conventions, institutions and consensus are stabilizations, this means they are stabilizations of something essentially unstable and chaotic. Thus it becomes necessary to stabilize precisely because stability is not natural; it is because there is instability, that stabilization is necessary; it is because there is chaos that there is a need for stability. Now this chaos and instability, which is fundamental, founding and irreducible, is at once naturally the worst against which we struggle with laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the same it is a chance, a chance to change, to destabilize. If there were continual stability, there would be no need for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, that politics exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that the possible and the impossible cross each other. [DAP 83-4] In this context we can understand depoliticization as the effect of a stabilization in the political field. ‘Chaos and instability’ becomes another name for what Derrida calls ‘democracy-to-come’ and ‘justice’ elsewhere. Depoliticizing stabilizations of this field of forces are necessary; but until we think chaos itself as fundamental, no kind of political thought will be able to grasp the 'chance to change’ or destabilize. This is what deconstruction offers to political theory, and it depends directly on the apparent refusal to repoliticize, to introduce a new ontology of politics. Deconstruction is apparently both the most radical and the most ascetic alternative to such theories as those of Schmitt and Benjamin, by seeking to discover a revolutionary potential in the everyday, to discern the possibility of destabilization attested to in the maintenance of the law, and to put into question political theory as in and of itself depoliticizing. Yet Derrida insists that repoliticization only has a chance if a decision could be thought without criteria, without rules or any defined or expected outcome. In the vocabulary of his essay 'Psyche: Inventions of the Other’, ‘the only possible invention is the invention of the impossible’ but ‘an invention of the impossible is impossible [.. .] It is in this paradoxical predicament that a deconstruction gets under way [qu'est engagée]’ [PSY 60 / 59]. But this is not to resign ourselves to just anything happening. As Derrida argues in ‘Force of Law’, ‘incalculable justice requires us to calculate’ [POL 28 / 61]. This calculation will not be without risk, but even in the worst circumstances, ‘there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without what [Derrida] would call a “Yes” to emancipation' [DAP 82].

#### Advocating against indefinite detention practices is an act of Hospitality towards the Other- autoimmunism constantly relates us to the Other, but prescribes limits to our interactions. We only relate to the Other insofar as we define ourselves as different from “them” and securitized from the danger “they” create. We refuse these notions and begin our advocacy with Hospitality- a way of radically reorienting our relationship to the Other. Hospitality requires breaking open those limitations and accepting the complete unknowability to a future we shouldn’t try to control, while accepting the possibility for destruction.

Johnson 10’ (Andrew, Lecturer at Open University, The Pathology of Politics: Derrida’s reading of Auto-immunity and Carl Schmitt 09/12/10)

Auto-immunity is a failed attempt by an organism to protect itself. It is clearly connected with another age-old Derridean trope: the¶ pharmakon¶ . The biological concept of auto-immunity is a question of health. In attempting to protect itself, it destroys itself; it plays both the role of both medicine and poison. “[T]his poisoned medicine, this¶ pharmakon¶ of an inflexible and cruel autoimmunity” (Rogues, p. 157). “Once again the state is both self-protecting and self-destroying, at once remedy and poison. The¶ pharmakon¶ is another name, an old name, for this autoimmunitary logic” (Time of Terror, p. 124).As Derrida says there is no condom for auto-immunity. “For there is no absolutely reliable prophylaxis against the autoimmune. By definition” (Rogues, p. 150-151). Auto-immunity is pregnant with itself. This pharmakon partition, between poison and medicine, between self and non-self, signifies both a threat and a chance. Therefore, auto-immunity is not necessarily bad. In fact, while it threatens, it retains a hopeful chance and hyperbolic promise. As Derrida says: “[O]pportunity or chance and threat, threat as chance: autoimmune” (Rogues, p. 52). “[A]lready a question of autoimmunity, of a¶ double bind ¶ of threat and chance” (Rogues, p. 82). We must be cautious to not easily discount auto-immunity as a mere poison threatening to destroy our defenses, but as a possible medicine that opens up chances and hope. The threat is perfectly apparent; however, what is the optimistic chance of auto-immunity? Quite simply, hospitality. In this regard, autoimmunity is not an absolute ill or evil. It enables an exposure to the other, to what and who comes- which means that it mustremain incalculable. Without autoimmunity, with absolute immunity, nothing would ever happen or arrive; we would no longer wait, await, or expect, no longer expect another, or expect any event (Rogues, p. 152).By opening itself up to the other, threatening to destroy itself, the organism has the chance to receive the other. The relationship of self and other is synonymous with Derrida’s ethics of hospitality. In the twilight of Derrida’s late career, he began to posit a novel attempt at ethics. One of his most important contributions is his defense of a hyperbolic ethics of unconditional hospitality: we must remain open to the other, without conditions. A hospitality, worthy of its name, must never prescribe limits to the other if it expects to redeem its full and pure ethical value.

#### **Hospitality cannot function without an opening- Autoimmunism forces us to constantly relate to the other, providing space for radical action which moves us towards democracy to come. Miller 09** (J. Harris, *Derrida’s Politics of Autoimmunity,* Originally published 2008 in Discourse Journal, updated May 23, 2009, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/dis/summary/v030/30.1-2.miller.html>)

What should we do in this terrifying situation? What does Derrida¶ suggest that we should do? **The logic of** **autoimmunization**, the¶ reader will have noted, has one **positive** aspect. It keeps a community,¶ a political entity, open to the wholly other, for example, **to the**¶ **democracy to come.** That means **we** can, **must**, and should still **work**,¶ according to the classic emancipatory ideal, as best we can **in the¶ concrete situation in which we find ourselves, to move**, even were it¶ **only an inch or a centimeter, closer toward the democracy** (perhaps)¶ **to come**. It is our responsibility to do so. The present Democratic¶ Congress is making some moves in that direction.¶ Nevertheless, it will not do to be too cheerful or sanguine about¶ our ability to fulfill this measureless responsibility. One reason for¶ this, as Derrida powerfully argues in *The Gift of Death,* is **that the fulfillment¶ of one specific exigent political responsibility means “irresponsibilizing”¶ oneself in relation to all the other equally exigent¶ political obligations. Each responsibility is wholly other to all the¶ others. One cannot fulfill them all, though each is equally demanding**.¶ Beyond that, however, as Derrida says in a remarkably concentrated¶ passage in *Rogues* (*Voyous*), the last book he was able to read¶ proofs for during his mortal illness, the punctual or stigmatic instant¶ act of exercising sovereign decision, by way of the “*cracy*” in “democracy”¶ (“rule of the people” etymologically), inevitably infects the self¶ of the one who acts with suicidal autoimmunity. The passage is a¶ good example of the way a swarm of Derrida’s key terms are often at¶ work in a given short passage. Citing it in conclusion will give Derrida¶ the last word:¶ Finally, and especially, however one understands *cratic* sovereignty [*la souveraineté¶* cratique], it has appeared as a stigmatic indivisibility that always¶ contracts duration into the timeless instant of the exceptional decision.¶ Sovereignty neither gives nor gives itself the time; it does not take time.¶ Here is where the cruel autoimmunity with which sovereignty is affected¶ begins, the autoimmunity with which sovereignty at once sovereignly¶ affects and cruelly infects itself. Autoimmunity is always, in the same time¶ without duration, cruelty itself, the autoinfection of all autoaffection. It is¶ *Derrida’s Politics of Autoimmunity 223¶* not some particular thing that is affected in autoimmunity, but the self, the¶ *ipse,* the *autos* that finds itself infected. As soon as it needs heteronomy, the¶ event, time, and the other.11

**Embracing an ethic of democracy to come is essential to confront the massive every day instances of violence which support the international system.**Derrida 1995, dir d’etudes @ Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Jacques, The Gift of Death  83-7

What is thus found at work in everyday discourse, in the exercise of justice, and first and foremost in the axiomatics of private, public, or international law, in the conduct of internal politics, diplomacy, and war, is a lexicon concerning responsibility that can be said to hover vaguely about a concept that is nowhere to be found, even if we can’t go so far as to say that it doesn’t correspond to any concept at all. It amounts to a disavowal whose resources, as once knows, are inexhaustible. One simply keeps on denying the aporia and antimony, tirelessly, and one treats as nihilist, relativist, even poststructuralist, and worse still deconstructionist, all those who remain concerned in the face of such a display of good conscience. The sacrifice of Isaac is an abomination in the eyes of all, and it should continue to be seen for what it is—atrocious, criminal, unforgivable; Kierkegaard insists on that. The ethical point of view must remain valid: Abraham is a murderer. However, is it not true that the spectacle of this murder, which seems intolerable in the denseness and rhythm of its theatricality, is at the same time the most common event in the world? Is it not inscribed in the structure of our existence to the extent of no longer constituting an event? It will be said that it would be most improbable for the sacrifice of Isaac to be repeated in our day; and it certainly seems that way. We can hardly imagine a father taking is son to be sacrificed on the top of the hill at Montmarte. If God didn’t send a lamb as a substitute or an angel to hold back his arm, there would still be a prosecutor, preferably with an expertise in Middle Eastern violence, to accuse him of infanticide or first-degree murder; and if a psychiatrist who was both something of a psychoanalyst and something f a journalist declared that the father was “responsible,” carrying on as if psychoanalysis had done nothing to upset the order of discourse on intention, conscience, good will, etc., the criminal father would have no chance of getting away with it. He might claim that the wholly other had ordered him to do it, and perhaps in secret (how would he know that?), in order to test his faith, but it would make no difference. Things are such that this man would surely be condemned by any civilized society. On the other hand, **the smooth functioning of such a society, the monotonous complacency of its discourses on morality, politics,** and the law, and the exercise of its rights (whether public, private, national or international), **are in no way impaired by the fact that, because of the structure of the laws of the market that society has instituted and controls, because of the mechanisms of external debt and other similar inequities, that same “society” puts to death or** (but failing to help someone in distress accounts for only a minor difference) **allows to die of hunger and disease tens of millions of children** (those neighbors or fellow humans that ethics or the discourse of the rights of man refer to) **without any moral or legal tribunal ever being considered competent to judge such a sacrifice, the sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself**. Not only is it true that **such a society** participates in this incalculable sacrifice, it actually **organizes it.** The smooth functioning of its economic, political, and legal affairs, the smooth functioning of its moral discourse and good conscience and **presupposes the permanent operation of this sacrifice**. And such a sacrifice is not even invisible, for from time to time television shows us, while keeping them at a distance, a series of intolerable images, and a few voices are raised to bring it all to our attention. But these images and voices are completely powerless to induce the slightest effective change in the situation, to assign the least responsibility, to furnish anything more than a convenient alibi. That this order is founded upon a bottomless chaos (the abyss or open mouth) is something that will necessarily be brought home one day to those who just as necessarily forget the same. We are not even talking about wars, the less recent or most recent ones, in which cases one can wait an eternity for morality or international law (whether violated with impunity or invoked hypocritically) to determine with any degree of certainty who is responsible or guilty for the hundreds of thousands of victims who are sacrificed for what or whom one knows not, countless victims, each of those whose singularity becomes each time infinitely singular, every other (one) being every (bit) other, whether they be victims of the Iraqi state or victims of the international coalition that accuses the latter of not respecting the law. For in the discourses that dominate during such wars, it is rigorously impossible, on one side and the other, to discern the religious from the moral, the legal, from the political. The warring factions are all irreconcilable fellow worshipers of the religions of the Book. Does that not make things converge once again in the fight to the death that continues to rage on Mount Moriah over the possession of the secret of the sacrifice by an Abraham who never said anything? Do they not fight in order to take possession of the secret of the as the sign of an alliance with God and to impose its order on the other, who becomes for his part nothing more than a murderer

#### This has meaning beyond an imagined world of politics- beyond the world of FIAT. Affirmatives seeking to speak out against continuous oppressive violence are indefinitely detained to the negative by framework arguments that stop action from materializing. That causes ressentiment and inevitably fails- we must affirm power through the 1AC.

Newman ’00 (Saul, Postdoctoral Fellow @ Macquarie U, Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment, Theory & Event 4:3, muse)

However perhaps one could argue that this desire for power in ~~man~~ is produced precisely through attempts to deny or extinguish relations of power in the ‘natural order’. Perhaps power may be seen in terms of Lacanian Real—as that irrepressible lack that cannot be symbolized and which always returns to haunt the symbolic order, distrupting any attempt by the subject to form a complete identity. For Jaques Lacan: “…the real is that which always comes back to the same place—to the place where the subject in so far as he thinks, where the res cogitans, does not meet it.” (4.5) Anarchism attempts to complete the identity of the subject by separating him, in an absolute Mechanism sense, from the world of power. The amarchist subject, as we have seen, is constituted in a ‘natural’ system that is dialectically opposed to the articifical world of power. Morevoer because the subject is constituted in a ‘natural’ system governed by ethical laws of mutual cooperation, anarchists are able to posit a society free from relations of power, which will replace the State once it is overthrown. However, as we have seen, this world free of power is jeopardized by the desire for power latent in every individual. The more anarchism tries to free society from relations of power, the more it remains paradoxically caught up in power. Power here has returned as the *real* that haunts all attempts to free the world of power. The more one tries to repress power, the more obstinately it rears its head. This is because the attempts to deny power through essentialist concepts of ‘natural’ laws and ‘natural’ morality, themselves constitute power, or at least are conditioned by relations of power. These essentialist identities and categories cannot be imposed without the radical exclusion of other identities. This exclusion is an act of power. If one attempts to radically exclude power, as the anarchists did, power ‘returns’ precisely in the structures of exclusion themselves, Nietzsche believes that this attempt to exclude and deny power is a form of ressentiment. So how does anarchism overcome this ressentiment that has shown to be so self destructive and life-denying? By positively affirming power, rather than denying it—to say yes to power, as Nietzche would put it. It is only by affirming power, by acknowledging that we come from the same world as power, not from a natural world removed from it, and that we can never be entirely free from relations of power that one can engage in politically-relevant strategies of resistance against power. This does not mean, of course, that anarchism should lay down its arms and embrace the State and political authority. On the contrary, anarchism can more effectively counter political domination by engaging with, rather than denying power.

Ressentiment culminates in loss of value to life and the construction of external enemies

Newman ’00

Slave morality is characterized by the attitude of ressentiment—the resentment and hatred of the powerless for the powerful. Nietzche sees ressentiment as an entirely negative sentiment—the attitude of denying what is life-affirming, saying ‘no’ to what is different, what is ‘outside’ or ‘other.’ Ressentiment is characterized by an orientation to the outside, rather than the focus of noble morality, which is on the self. While the master says ‘I am good’ and adds as an afterthought, ‘therefore he is bad’; the slave says the opposite—he (the master) is bad, therefore I am good. Thus the invention of values comes from a comparison or opposition to that which is outside, other, different. Nietzche says “…in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world. It needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act all. Its action is basically a reaction. This reactive stance, this inability to define anything except in opposition to something else, is the attitude of ressentiment. It is the reactive stance of the weak who define themselves in opposition to the strong. The weak need the existence of this external enemy to identify themselves as ‘good’. Thus the slave takes ‘imaginary revenge’ upon the master, as he cannot act without the existence of the master to oppose. The ~~man~~ of ressentiment hates the noble with an intense spite, a deep-seated, seething hatred and jealousy. It is this ressentiment, according to Nietzche, that has poisoned the modern consciousness and finds its expression in ideals of equality and democracy, and in radical political philosophies, like anarchism, that advocate it.

# 2AC

## Word PIC

### This isn’t our aff- their author is criticizing the idea that detention doesn’t imply that the people are held there for a long time- INDEFINITE detention solves that.

### No counterplan solvency:

**The perm solves and is net beneficial – pure rejection of terms leads to linguistic idealism and leaves us unable to address material reality- only juxtaposing terms through the permutation can create space for productive dissent.**

Bleiker 2K (Roland, Ass. Prof. of International Relations @ Queensland U, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics, pgs. 224-226)

Noam Chomsky provides another example of the links between language and transversal politics. He argues that mainstream discourses linguistically presented in the American ‘involvement’ in Vietnam such that the actual thought of an aggression or invasion was unthinkable, and this despite readily available evidence in support of such an interpretation. The same linguistic dynamic of exclusion is at work in international relation theory, where the dominant realist language renders discussions of epistemology virtually impossible. Consider how Robert Gilpin criticizes the post-structuralist language of Richard Ashley by declaring entirely unintelligible his claim that ‘the objective truth of discourse lies within and is produced by the discourse itself.’ The concepts used in this sentence not only make perfect sense to any critical social theorist, but also are essential for the articulation of an epistemological critique. Yet, read through the Newspeak of scientific realist, the very idea of epistemological critique is a heretic thought and the sentence thus becomes simply untranslatable. The language of realism has rendered any challenge to its own political foundations unthinkable. How can one turn language from a system of exclusion to a practice of inclusion, from a method to domination to an instrument of resistance? And how can one appreciate the transversal dimensions that are entailed in these sites of everyday struggle? The starting point lies with what is aptly called Sprachkritik in German. Literally translated as ‘critique of language’, Sprachkritik is, at least according to the linguist Fritz Mauthner, ‘the most important task (Geschaft) of thinking humanity.’ The poet Paul Valery probably captured its objective best when claiming that ‘the secret of well founded thinking is based on suspicion towards language’. If challenges to practices of domination and attempts to open up thinking space are to avoid being absorbed by the dominant discourse, then they must engage in a struggle with conventionally recognized linguistic practices, or at least with the manner in which these practices have been constituted. The form of speaking and writing becomes as important as their content. Dissent cannot be separated from critique of language, for it remains ineffective as long as it does not interfere with the ways in which linguistic systems of exclusion constitute and objectivize social practices. But can a language so easily be appropriated as a tool of dissent against its own subjugating power? Is it enough, as Nietzsche suggests, to ‘create new names, estimations and probabilities to create eventually new “things.”’ Of course not. One can never be free within language. One can never break free from language. The point is, rather, to acknowledge that an individual has no possibility to function as an authentic perceiver or agent, that the spaces for action opened up by critique are still circumscribed by the larger boundaries of linguistic structures. Moreover, critique of language must be careful not be trapped in an idealism that suggests the world exists only because it is perceived by our mind, that objects outside the mental sphere have no qualities of their own. Such a working assumption would go astray in a futile search for the perfect language and, by doing so, fall back into the logical positivism from which the later Wittgenstein so carefully tried to escape. Because there is no direct and logical correspondence between words and meaning, between a name and a thing, a spear-heading into unexplored linguistic terrains can only be socially meaningful if it stretches the rules of existing language games while never losing sight of the ways in which these language games constitute and are constituted by concrete forms of life. The point, then, is to articulate resistance at the edge of language games, that is, to avoid lifting words out of their social and dialogical context while, at the same time, exploring to the utmost the unstable and transformative nature of languages. This is best done, I argue, by interfering with the ways in which languages constitute sites of political practice, sites where realities are formed, reformed, legitimized, and objectivized through a series of transversal discursive dynamics.

### PICs Bad

* 1. **Forces us to argue against our own affirmative, especially textually competitive counterplans. It’s impossible to generate offense.**
	2. **Clash and Education – they justify trivial counterplans that undermine education, unpredictable net benefits means we never have the pre-round prep to garner offense against the counterplan.**

### Their counterplan fails to be textually competitive. Textual competition good:

* 1. Prevents advocacy shifts – holding teams to texts prevents shifts
	2. Greater education – Textual competition forces the negative to write counterplan texts consistent with solvency advocates
	3. True test of competition – without seeing what plan allows and precludes through text, we cannot determine true competition

### Perm: Do the affirmative. Their inclusion of the plan within their advocacy justifies the perm because they agree that plan is a good idea and can be done without causing their impacts.

## Public Sphere

#### Refusal to investigate racism in this space makes politics impossible. Offsets all their offense.

Giroux ‘11

Henry A Giroux, Truthout, Occupy Colleges Now: Students as the New Public Intellectuals, 21 November 2011, <http://truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=5046:occupy-colleges-now--students-as-the-new-public-intellectuals>

Of course, such a position is at odds with those intellectuals who have retreated into arcane discourses that offer the cloistered protection of the professional recluse. Making few connections with audiences outside of the academy or to the myriad issues that bear down on everyday lives, many academics became increasingly irrelevant, while humanistic inquiry suffers the aftershocks of flagging public support. The Occupy Wall Street protesters have refused this notion of the deracinated, if not increasingly irrelevant, notion of academics and students as disinterested intellectuals. They are not alone. Refusing the rewards of apolitical professionalism or obscure specialization so rampant on university campuses, Roy has pointed out that intellectuals need to ask themselves some very "uncomfortable questions about our values and traditions, our vision for the future, our responsibilities as citizens, the legitimacy of our 'democratic institutions,' the role of the state, the police, the army, the judiciary, and the intellectual community."[[1]](http://truth-out.org/index.php#1) Similarly, Scarry points to the difficulty of seeing an injury and injustice, the sense of futility of one's own small efforts, and the special difficulty of lifting complex ideas into the public sphere.[[2]](http://truth-out.org/index.php#2) Derrida has raised important questions about the relationship between critique and the very nature of the university and the humanities, as when he writes: The university without condition does not, in fact, exist, as we know only too well. Nevertheless, in principle and in conformity with its declared vocation, its professed essence, it should remain an ultimate place of critical resistance - and more than critical - to all the power of dogmatic and unjust appropriation.[[3]](http://truth-out.org/index.php#3)

Mills 1

Charles W. Mills, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago, 2001, “Faces of Environmental Racism: Confronting Issues of Global Justice (2nd ed.,), p. 84-89

Segregation by law is the clearest manifestation of the physical control of the space of an inferior group, a group excluded from full membership in the polity, a group that must be morally, politically, and physically contained. And such “containment” would become the policy in the North also. In their account of what they call “American apartheid,” Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton argue that before 1900, “blacks and whites were relatively integrated in both northern and southern cities.” But all this would change with Jim Crow and mass black migration from the South. Through “a series of self-conscious actions and purposeful institutional arrangements that continue today,.. . actions and practices that had the passive acceptance, if not the active support, of ¶ most whites in the United States,” blacks were deliberately denied entry to white neighborhoods. By contrast, new European immigrants formed at worst “ethnic enclaves” rather than ghettoes. These enclaves were never homogeneous, were not particularly isolated, and unlike “permanent” black ghettoes, were “a fleeting, transitory stage in the process of immigrant assimilation.” Thus they were all eventually “spatially assimilated.” For blacks, on the other hand, the racial contract would inscribe—through neighborhood associations, real-estate dealers, redlining, restrictive covenants, and mob violence when necessary—a geography of aversion that would ultimately make blacks “the most spatially isolated population in U.S. history.”31Race, then, is the basic organizing spatial principle of the extended body of the polity. Fanon points out that “Consciousness of the body . . . is a third-person consciousness.”32 Similarly, Gail Weiss has devised the concept of “intercorporeality” to signify the multiple, reflexive interrelations between our bodies, our perceptions of our bodies, and the reciprocal shaping of those perceptions by seeing ourselves through the perceptions of others: “To describe embodiment as intercorporeality is to emphasize that the experience of being embodied is never a private affair, but is always already mediated by our continual interactions with other human and nonhuman bodies.” Our “body images” are thus “constructed through a series of corporeal exchanges that take place both within and outside of specific bodies.”33 Applying this concept to political theory, one could say that the white members of the body politic continually exchange their whiteness with each other, recognizing each others’ bodies in the light of their full membership in the polity, and so reciprocally creating that polity. As white, as a full citizen, one’s body mirrors the larger body. One walks with confidence in the knowledge that one’s citizenship will be recognized, since it is written on one’s body—it is one’s body. There is a macro-body, the collective white body, sustained by intersubjective, artificial, “contractual” agreement between the full humans, whose space is the locus of the body politic proper. And it is recognized as appropriate, through relations of unequal corporeal exchange, that the black body—in a sense the “nonhuman body”—be excluded from the macro-body.¶ Mainstream environmentalism is thus the environmentalism appropriate to this body—the normative body, the white body. Since white space has been historically privileged, white environmentalists can place their emphases on preservation and conservation, slogans appropriate for those whose spaces have benefited from full incorporation into the white macrobody. If the role of the sovereign, as “soul” (Hobbes) of the body politic, is to maintain the body’s health, then the role of the white sovereign is to ensure the health of the white body. For a state founded on the racial contract, this will mean the differential allocation of resources to the creation and protection of white spaces. And historically, the state has in fact made both space and race, through demarcating by law the populations coded as races, through enforcing segregation, and through divergent treatment of the respective divided spaces. Desmond King, an English political scientist, points out the disingenuousness of a mainstream U.S. political theory that “little acknowledges” the obvious fact that the federal government “constituted a powerful institution upholding arrangements privileging Whites and discriminating against Blacks.”34 The racial state acts on behalf of the white citizenry, pouring resources into the privileged white spaces—schools, infrastructure, job creation, highways, mortgage assistance, police protection—since they are our spaces, the spaces that we, the full citizens of the polity, inhabit. So there is no common space, as in the mythical raceless social contract. Rather, there are our spaces and their spaces.¶ But even their spaces are in a sense ours—they are the spaces we concede to them, insofar as (short of outright expulsion) they have to occupy some space. Originally, it is explicit, then, that blacks do not have free range over the topography of the body politic. Rather, they are restricted to second-class spaces, as befitting their second-class, subperson status:¶ Niggertown, Darktown, Bronzeville, the black belt, the ghetto, the inner city, in housing arrangements; and, when they are allowed to enter the public white space, the back of the bus, the seats in the balcony, the crowded car at the end of the train. These spaces become identified as black spaces, and are derogated as such, signaling their nomncorporation in the respectable flesh of the white body politic. King describes how:¶ Prior to the end of segregation, the United States was subnationally a divided polity. Two political systems, mirroring two societies, the one democratic and the other oligarchic, existed side by side. . . . Segregation was an arrangement whereby Black Americans, as a minority, were systematically treated in a separate, but constitutionally sanctioned way. As the NAACP observed, they were treated “almost as lepers.”35¶ And this leprous flesh, the boundary of political, moral, and spatial exclusion from the body politic proper, marks the limits of the sovereign’s full responsibilities. As derogated space, inhabited by beings of lesser worth, it is a necessary functionalist space ¶ analogous to the body parts below the belt, the ones we keep hidden. Since the normative body is the white body, the black body, or the unavoidable black parts of the white body—its waste products, its excreta—need to be kept out of white sight. White space needs to be maintained in its character as white and preserved from contamination by the ever- threatening dark space—evil, shitty, savage, subproletananized. On the collective white macro-body, these spaces are literally blots on the landscape that we have to tolerate but that must not be allowed to trespass beyond their borders. The politics of racial space then requires that the line be drawn, the boundaries not crossed. These spaces must stay in their place. The racial contract is in part an agreement to maintain certain spatial relations, a certain spatial regime, the incarnation of the white body politic, the physical manifestation of the white Leviathan.¶ In this revised conceptual framework, then, it becomes unsurprising that the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice found in the first national study on the topic (1987):¶  Race is “the single most important factor (i.e., more important than income, home ownership rate, and property values) in the location of abandoned toxic waste sites.”36¶  Some black residents of these areas feel “We don’t have the complexion for protection.”37¶  A national investigation (1992) by the National Law Journal of Enviromnental Protection Agency cleanup efforts concluded “that the average fine imposed on polluters in white areas was 506 percent higher than the average fine imposed in minority communities” and that “cleanup took longer in minority communities, even though the efforts were often less intensive than those performed in white neighborhoods.”38¶  Mainstream white environmentalists are perceived as caring more about parks and owls than people of color.39¶  “Institutional resistance to providing information [on environmental issues] is likely to be greater for groups such as racial minorities.”¶  In general, “Public officials and private industry have, in many cases, responded to the NIMBY [Not in My Black Yard] phenomenon using the ‘PIBBY’ principle, ‘Place in Blacks’ Back Yards.’ “41¶ In effect, then, these spaces can be written off because these people can be written off. The devalued space interacts with its devalued inhabitants. They are “outside” the boundaries of empathy, not like us, not an equally valued body in the intercorporeal community that is the collective white body. As Bill Lawson points out in chapter 3, “Living for the City: Urban United States and Environmental Justice” (p. 41): “[R]acial and spatial difference marks important differences that must be given weight in our moral deliberation.. . . Environmentalists have a natural conception of pollution as a negative norm. If a place is thought to be already polluted by racial identifiers, we need to contain the pollution by keeping it in that area.” Since these are already waste spaces, it is only appropriate that the waste products of industrialization should be directed toward them. Like seeks like—throwaways on a throwaway population, dumping on the white body’s dumpsite.

#### This racism is the root cause of violence

Foucault 76

Michel, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, p. 254-257 Trans. David Macey

What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower. Racism also has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies." But racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die" - function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more Ias species rather than individual-can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate." The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer. This is not, then, a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. So you can understand the importance-I almost said the vital importance-of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say "killing," I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. I think that we are now in a position to understand a number of things. We can understand, first of all, the link that was quickly-I almost said immediately-established between nineteenth-century biological theory and the discourse of power. Basically, evolutionism, understood in the broad sense-or in other words, not so much Darwin's theory itself as a set, a bundle, of notions (such as: the hierarchy of species that grow from a common evolutionary tree, the struggle for existence among species, the selection that eliminates the less fit) naturally became within a few years during the nineteenth century not simply a way of transcribing a political discourse into biological terms, and not simply a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific clothing, but a real way of thinking about the relations between colonization, the necessity for wars, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness, the history of societies with their different classes, and so on. Whenever, in other words, there was a confrontation, a killing or the risk of death, the nineteenth century was quite literally obliged to think about them in the form of evolutionism. And we can also understand why racism should have developed in modern societies that function in the biopower mode; we can understand why racism broke out at a number of .privileged moments, and why they were precisely the moments when the right to take life was imperative. Racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide. If you are functioning in the biopower mode, how can you justify the need to kill people, to kill populations, and to kill civilizations? By using the themes of evolutionism, by appealing to a racism. War. How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens to war, and let them be killed by the million (and this is precisely what has been going on since the nineteenth century, or since the second half of the nineteenth century), except by activating the theme of racism.

## Buddism

The alt is nihilistic – this is an act of pure multiplicity. Instead of simply accepting the harms of the sq, we should do something about it.

Caputo ‘97

(John D., David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Villanova University, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, pgs. 116-120)

This is not to say that Derrida lacks a concept of history--a common complaint about him and a common misunderstanding of the il n'y a pas de hors-texte notion. On the contrary, by depriving himself of the idea of either a teleological or an eschatological heading, Derrida has developed a more spare and radical idea of historical happening. For a culture to be "on the move" with otherwise-than-a-heading means to hold itself more radically open to a "future" (l'avenir), to what is to come (à venir). History, thus, is not a course set in advance headed toward its telos as toward a future-present, a foreseeable, plannable, programmable, anticipatable, masterable future. History means, rather, to set sail without a course, on the prow for something "new." Such an open-ended, non-teleological history is just what Derrida means by "history,"which means for him that something--an "event" -- is really happening, e-venting (é-venir), breaking out, tearing up the circular course of Greco-German time.History is not programmed in advance, for Derrida, not set to work within a pre-set archeo-teleological horizon, kept all along on course,keeping its head and its heading by way of some sort of ontological automatic-pilot( AC 22-24/ OH17-19). That is why when something comes along that nobody foresaw, that surprises the daylight out of us, we say it is very "historical." Everybody--from Ronald Reagan to the most internationally famous "Sovietologists" in all the world's most advanced "advanced institutes"--was left speechless by the "historic" turn of events in the "former" Soviet Union. Who would have believed any of us would have lived to use that phrase--as recently as ten years ago? The paradigmatic gesture of European "modernity" for Derrida is an "auto-biographical" project in which European thinkers tell the story of Europe as the avant-garde and "promontory" of the West--and on this point Heidegger could not be more modernist--composing a eulogy to a Europe that sets the heading for Western, indeed global destiny. That is the line that Derrida would have Europe drop, so as not to close itself within its own identity, and so as to set out instead for another shore, the shore of the other, of the tout autre, "the beyond of this modern tradition" ( AC33/ OH29). That is whythe present nationalist tremors in Central Europe ought not to be described as a "crisis" of the European "spirit." For a crisis--of which there are Hegelian, Heideggerian, and Husserlian versions--is a thoroughly modernist idea that has to do with a "dramatic instant of decision" (krinein) in which European self-identity is at stake. It was all the hype about a spiritual crisis--of the debilitation of the German and Western Spirit, its Entmachung--that fueled the fires of Heidegger's National Socialism (and that of quite a few others, too). Even today Francis Fukuyama can proclaim that the world-historical decision has been made, the crisis resolved, the end reached. Europe has reached its teleological fulfillment as the whole globe has opted--is still opting, the crisis will be over in a matter of weeks, now--for Euro-American "capitalism" and a market economy, and the Evil Empire has come crashing to the ground (kaputt). Derrida would warn us against not one but two "capitalisms" (from caput), by which he means two too powerful headings, the one having to do with a cultural hegemony, the rule of European "culture," emblematized by the European "capitals" (la capitale, the capital city), and the other the hegemony of economic capitalism(le capitale), the one criticized by Marx in Das Kapital. If we were to force a "philosophy of history" out of deconstruction, which would be too prestigious a label (heading) for Derrida, we might say thatdeconstruction can be viewed as an attempt to extricate us from two too dominant headings that are trying to steer everythingand thereby to restore the play or slack or chance with which history happens. (1) In the "Roundtable,"Derrida expresses his concern about the current state of "international law" and "international organizations."To be sure, he is not opposed to such notions in principle. His concerns are that such international structures are not very international, that they do not reflect the will of many nations speaking together,but are dominated by the largest and richest nations. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have been dominated by the United States in particular, whose wealth and power, no longer checked by Soviet power, simply overwhelms the voice and influence of smaller, poorer countries. "Internationalism," Derrida points out, has a peculiar way of cooperating with "nationalism" (AC 49/OH 48). That is so in part because it presupposes the existence andsovereignty of the several member nations; in the "Roundtable," Derrida wonders whether a "new International" might actually get beyond nationality and national citizenship to something post-national, post-geographic. It is also true because such international associations have a way of ending up serving the interests of the most powerful member-nations, nations who set the international course. Indeed, such nations mask this power with meta-narratives that show them to have been chosen by History, or the Spirit, or Destiny, or Being to lead the way. One nation decides that its destiny is to set the course for Europe, and thereby for the world, so that the whole planet can become itself, that is, European, with Paris, London, or Berlin at the head of the fleet.That is what Derrida would have Europe avoid, and this by way of biting the bullet of the impossible. That means, on the one hand, learning to cultivate difference while avoiding both "dispersion" and "monopoly." As he says in the "Roundtable," either pure unity or pure multiplicity is a "synonym of death." Pure unity would be totalitarian, and pure multiplicity would be anarchistic; either way, a catastrophe. On the one hand, Europe needs to avoid dispersion because it is in constant danger of deteriorating into a myriad of nationalist idioms and self-enclosed idiolects, into a European "apartheid." 11 On the other hand, Europeans need to cultivate cooperation while avoiding "monopoly," a translation of their differences into a single overarching standardization which circulates across the lines of a transnational teletechnology. That would wipe out national difference by establishing a uniform grid of intelligibility, a trans-national cultural capital, a central switchboard, a central power, a capital that is not a particular city or metropolis.Such a world would be generically Euro-Americanor NATO-ese; it would speak American/English, the new lingua franca, and it would be driven by a European science that stretches from Copernicus, Galileo, and Isaac Newton to M.I.T. and Silicon Valley.For this world "politics" is perhaps no longer an adequate term; it would be rather a "quasi-politics" of the tele-techno-scientific world, the virtual world (AC 41-43/OH 38-40). To move ahead in the midst of such an aporia, to proceed where the way seems blocked, that is to "experience the impossible"(AC 43/ OH 41) to pass through, to travel through the aporia of impossibility (AC 46-47/OH 45-46).Only then is there a genuine "responsibility," which means the need to respond to a situation that has not been programmed in advance, to invent new gestures, to affirm an unstable identity that differs from itself. That impossibility is the only possible invention, the invention of the other: The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention [AC 43/OH 41]. (2) The other capitalism is the one criticized by Marx and celebrated by the free market triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama, in which all the evils of capitalism, the vast disparity of rich and poor nations, of rich and poor people in the same nation, are swept under the rug of the march of the absolute spirit of economic freedom and the free market: [N]ever have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity [SdM 141/SoM 85]. All the blatant injustice and manifest suffering of such a world is treated as a temporary blip or empirical shortfall of the absolute progress of an Idea whose time has come, is indeed being fulfilled before our eyes as the Evil Empire comes crashing down. That argument, first broached here, is developed in greater detail in Specters of Marx.In the face of such suffering Derrida calls for a "new International," which does not mean an anachronistic revival of a worn-out Marxist idea, another try at an international association of workers with international headquarters somewhere.This international "community," which would barely deserve the name of "community" (SdM 148/SoM 90), would be forged from forces that have resisted Marxist dogma on the one hand but have been no less resistant to conservative and reactionary tendencies. The new International would form an ethical and moral coalition of all those who are, as he says in the "Roundtable, " "secretly aligned in their suffering against the hegemonic powers which protect what is called the 'new order.'" They would constitute a coalition of everyone who is done in or headed off by the dominant heading, every who is left out, de-posed, "de-capitated" by their race, income, gender, nationality, language, religion, or even species (animal rights)--in a nutshell, by their "difference."